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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) has increasingly sought to tackle irregular migration through 
cooperation with third countries. One of the key instruments in this regard have been 
EU readmission agreements (EURAs), which commit non-EU countries to take back 
irregular migrants. The European Commission obtained a mandate to negotiate an 
EURA with Morocco already in 2000, but negotiations have thus far remained 
inconclusive. This paper aims to shed light on the reasons for this failure. It argues that 
an EURA could not be concluded because the incentives offered by the EU have 
been insufficient, for instance in the case of legal migration and mobility, or they were 
granted despite the lack of cooperation. Considerable funding and the symbolically 
important ‘advanced status’ under the European Neighbourhood Policy were 
allocated to Morocco anyway because the EU is dependent on Morocco for 
migration control. This dependency puts the EU in a weak bargaining position as it 
cannot credibly withhold benefits in case of Morocco’s non-compliance. The 
credibility of the EU’s conditionality is further undermined by inconsistencies within its 
multilevel system of governance. The existence of bilateral alternatives to an EURA is 
particularly problematic in this regard. Based on these findings, the paper suggests 
that the EU should (1) conclude more readmission agreements with countries of origin 
to take some pressure off Morocco; (2) link the allocation of funding and the 
conclusion of new agreements to progress in the EURA negotiations; (3) lower its 
dependence on Morocco by enhancing its own border control capabilities; (4) 
relaunch the negotiations for a visa facilitation agreement and broaden their scope; 
and (5) increase coherence in order to present a united front to Morocco. 
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Introduction 
Cooperation with third countries on return and readmission has long been considered 
an important element of the European Union’s (EU) strategy to tackle irregular 
migration. However, with the advent of the so-called ‘migration and refugee crisis’ in 
2015 the issue has really moved to the centre of political attention. In September 2017, 
the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker reaffirmed the 
importance of an effective readmission policy in his State of the Union Address: 
“People who have no right to stay in Europe must be returned to their countries of 
origin. When only 36% of irregular migrants are returned, it is clear we need to 
significantly step up our work.”1 The new focus on readmission is also reflected in the 
number of policy documents that have recently been published on the issue. The 
European Agenda on Migration (2015), the EU’s Action Plan on Return (2015) and the 
New Partnership Framework (2016) all emphasise the importance of improving 
cooperation with third countries on return and readmission. 
So far, the EU has managed to conclude readmission agreements (EURAs) with 17 
countries and autonomous regions: Hong Kong (2004), Macao (2004), Sri Lanka (2005), 
Albania (2006), Russia (2007), Ukraine (2008), Macedonia (2008), Bosnia and Herze-
govina (2008), Montenegro (2008), Serbia (2008), Moldova (2008), Pakistan (2010), 
Georgia (2011), Armenia (2014), Azerbaijan (2014), Turkey (2014) and Cape Verde 
(2014).2 As can be seen from this list, EURAs mainly cover EU candidate countries and 
countries located in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. By contrast, the EU has had 
difficulties to conclude readmission agreements with countries in its southern 
neighbourhood. Negotiating mandates have been adopted for Morocco (2000), 
Algeria (2002), Tunisia (2014) and Jordan (2015).3 However, until now none of these 
negotiations has been successful. 
The negotiations with Morocco constitute a particularly interesting case. Morocco has 
refused to sign an EURA for almost 20 years and an agreement is still not in sight. This is 
puzzling given the fact that Morocco has been one of the main countries of origin and 
transit of irregular migrants. One could assume that the EU would do anything to 
                                                 
1 J.-C. Juncker, President of the European Commission, “Catching the wind in our sails”, State 
of the Union Address 2017, Brussels, 13 September 2017, p. 4. 
2 European Commission, Return and Readmission, retrieved 27 April 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy/return-readmission_en. 
3 Ministry of the Interior of Finland, The EU or member states themselves are responsible for 
readmission agreements, retrieved 27 April 2019, https://intermin.fi/en/areas-of-expertise/ 
migration/voluntary-and-forced-return/readmission-agreements. 
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persuade such an important country to sign a readmission agreement. Morocco’s 
resistance to sign an EURA is also surprising when considering that it has a long-standing 
history of cooperation on migration matters with the EU and its member states, 
including the signature of bilateral readmission agreements.  
This paper aims to shed light on this issue and to answer the following research 
question: Why has the EU been unable to conclude a readmission agreement with 
Morocco? By examining the Moroccan case, the paper also intends to improve the 
general understanding of the obstacles related to EURA negotiations with the EU’s 
southern neighbours.  
Drawing on the ‘external incentives model’, the study argues that the EURA 
negotiations have not been successful because the incentives were either not strong 
enough to compensate for the considerable implementation costs or offered by the 
EU despite Morocco’s refusal to sign an EURA. Furthermore, the EU’s promises and 
threats have not been credible due to incoherence within the EU’s multilevel system 
of governance and the EU’s weak bargaining position vis-à-vis Morocco.  
The paper first explains the central assumptions of the external incentives model and 
how they can be applied to the EURA negotiations with Morocco. It then evaluates 
Morocco’s costs of implementing an EURA, before taking a closer look at the 
incentives that the EU has offered to compensate for these costs. Subsequently, the 
paper explores the different dimensions of coherence and explain how incoherence 
has weakened the EU’s credibility. In the final section, the paper assesses the 
bargaining position of the EU vis-à-vis Morocco. The conclusions put forward some 
recommendations for advancing the negotiations. 
The external incentives model 
Readmission agreements are reciprocal, meaning that both parties have the same 
obligations. However, in practice these agreements mainly serve the interests of the 
EU and its member states. Therefore, the successful conclusion of an EURA “depends 
very much of the ‘leverage’ at the Commission’s disposal, i.e. of sufficiently strong 
incentives to obtain the co-operation of relevant third countries on readmission”.4  
                                                 
4 M. Schieffer, “Community Readmission Agreements with Third Countries − Objectives, 
Substance and Current State of Negotiations”, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 5, 
no. 3, 2003, p. 356. 
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To analyse the Commission’s leverage vis-à-vis Morocco, the study applies the so-
called ‘external incentives model’. This rationalist bargaining model was originally 
developed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier in the context of enlargement. Their 
central assumption is that “a state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed 
the domestic adoption costs”.5 In the case of the candidate countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, the decisive factor for the adoption of EU rules was the perspective of 
EU membership.6 This reward is not on the table for Morocco. However, Trauner argues 
that the absence of membership conditionality can be compensated by “policy 
conditionality”, i.e. “material rewards that do not relate to EU accession”.7 Hence, the 
logic of the external incentives model can also be applied to the EURA negotiations.  
According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, two crucial factors for the effective use 
of conditionality are the benefits on offer and the compliance costs for third countries. 
Another factor to consider is the credibility of the EU’s conditionality, i.e. the credibility 
of its promise to deliver a certain reward in case of compliance and its threat to 
withhold it in case of non-compliance. 8 The credibility of the EU’s promises rests on the 
‘consistency’ or ‘coherence’ (this study uses the two terms interchangeably) of its 
actions. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that “[i]f the EU were perceived to 
subordinate conditionality to other political, strategic, or economic considerations, the 
target state might either hope to receive the benefits without fulfilling the conditions 
or conclude that it will not receive the rewards at any rate”.9 Following Gebhard, this 
paper further breaks down coherence into vertical, horizontal, internal/intra-
institutional and external coherence.10  
Furthermore, the threat to withhold or withdraw benefits will only be credible, if the EU 
possesses superior bargaining power.11 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier conceive 
bargaining power as “a function of asymmetric interdependence between the 
                                                 
5 F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 
11, no. 4, 2004, p. 664. 
6 Ibid., p. 669. 
7 F. Trauner, “From Membership Conditionality to Policy Conditionality: EU External Governance 
in South Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 16, no. 5, 2009, p. 776. 
8 Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, op. cit., pp. 665-666. 
9 Ibid., p. 666. 
10 C. Gebhard, “The Problem of Coherence in the European Union’s International Relations”, in 
Christopher Hill, Michael Smith & Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), International Relations and the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, 3rd edn., pp. 128-129.  
11 Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, op. cit., p. 665. 
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actors”.12 For conditionality to be effective, “[t]he EU must be able to withhold the 
rewards at no or low costs to itself, and it has to be less interested in giving the reward 
than the target government is in getting it”.13  
Thus, the paper identifies four explanatory factors that can account for the success or 
failure of EURA negotiations. The first two variables are the costs for implementing an 
EURA and the incentives offered by the EU to Morocco. The incentives must be in line 
with the interests of the third country and exceed the domestic adoption costs. The 
third variable is the coherence of the EU’s application of conditionality. This will be 
broken down into vertical, horizontal, internal/intra-institutional and external 
coherence. The fourth variable is the relative bargaining power of the Commission vis-
à-vis Morocco. Together, coherence and bargaining power determine the credibility 
of the EU’s conditionality. 
The following sections further explore each of these explanatory factors, starting with 
the implementation costs, moving on to incentives and coherence and ending with 
bargaining power. 
Implementation costs 
When assessing the costs of implementing an EURA, one has to distinguish between 
the readmission of nationals and third-country nationals (TCNs). States are obliged to 
readmit their own nationals under customary international law. This obligation is 
derived from Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that 
everyone has the right to return to his or her own country.14 In this respect, an EURA 
would not create any new obligations for Morocco but simply improve the implemen-
tation of an existing obligation. However, a higher return of Moroccan citizens would 
result in a loss of remittances, which represent an important source of income for the 
country.15 In 2017, the net outflow of remittances from the EU to Morocco amounted 
to € 3.3 billion.16 This amount is several times higher than the amount of € 189.5 million 
                                                 
12 F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Eastern Europe: The External 
Incentives Model Revisited, Paper for the JMF@25 conference, EUI, 22-23 June 2017, p. 3. 
13 Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality”, op. cit., p. 665. 
14 A. Roig & T. Huddleston, “EC Readmission Agreements: A Re-evaluation of the Political 
Impasse”, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 9, no. 3, 2007, p. 364. 
15 E. Paoletti, The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities: The Case of Italy and Libya, 
London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 49. 
16 R. Obrzut, Personal Remittances Statistics, Eurostat, November 2018.  
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that Morocco received under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI).17 Many 
Moroccan families depend on remittances and would lose their financial basis if their 
relatives were forcibly returned to Morocco.18 The conclusion of an EURA is therefore 
highly unpopular among the Moroccan population.19 The massive return of Moroccan 
citizens would also put pressure on the country’s labour market, which is already 
marked by low employment rates, and require expensive re-integration measures.20  
Even more problematic than the readmission of Moroccan citizens is the issue of 
TCNs.21 Contrary to the case of nationals, there is no international legal obligation to 
readmit TCNs. Morocco fears that the inclusion of a respective clause in the EURA 
would turn it into a ‘dumping ground’ for irregular migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa.22 
The Kingdom is also concerned about negative repercussions for its relations with 
countries of origin. Morocco’s cooperation on readmission would deprive them of 
valuable remittances and create negative images of Moroccan authorities using 
coercion to deport migrants on Europe’s behalf.23 That is why Moroccan authorities 
have repeatedly stressed that they have no intention of becoming ‘Europe’s 
policemen’.24 Over the last decade, the Kingdom has invested heavily in improving its 
relations with African countries. This rapprochement has been motivated by economic 
as well as political interests. On the one hand, Morocco wants to diversify its economy 
and benefit from the high growth rates in African countries. On the other hand, it needs 
their political support for its contested claims over Western Sahara.25 Morocco’s Africa 
policy has already borne fruits with the country’s re-accession to the African Union in 
January 2017. However, Morocco’s application for membership of the Economic 
                                                 
17 European Commission, Morocco, Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood Policy 
And Enlargement Negotiations, 19 December 2018. 
18 F. Trauner & I. Kruse, “EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: A New Standard EU 
Foreign Policy Tool?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 10, no. 4, 2008, p. 431. 
19 D. Wunderlich, “Differentiation and Policy Convergence against Long Odds: Lessons from 
Implementing EU Migration Policy in Morocco”, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 15, no. 2, 2010, p. 
251. 
20 S. Carrera, R. Radescu & N. Reslow, EU External Migration Policies: A Preliminary Mapping of 
the Instruments, the Actors and their Priorities, Report prepared for the FP7 project 
‘Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of 
People’ (EURA-NET), 2015, p. 12. 
21 Interview with an EU official, DG Home, European Commission, via e-mail, 30 April 2019. 
22 N. Coleman, European Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights, 
Leiden, Brill, 2008, p. 151. 
23 S. Carrera et al., “EU-Morocco Cooperation on Readmission, Borders and Protection: A Model 
to Follow?”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe”, no. 87, Brussels, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, January 2016, p. 6. 
24 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Morocco Plans to Deport Migrants Arrested at the 
Spanish Border Amid Wider Restriction of Immigration Policy, 26 October 2018. 
25 Carrera et al., op. cit., p. 6. 
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Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is still pending due to fears of some 
members states that it would dominate the organisation and act as a ‘Trojan horse’ 
for EU and US companies.26 Therefore, Morocco does not want to alienate its West 
African neighbours through the implementation of an EURA.  
This section has shown that the implementation of an EURA would imply significant 
costs for Morocco. Most importantly, it would result in a loss of remittances and burden 
Morocco’s relations with its African neighbours. In the next section, the study looks at 
the incentives that the EU has offered to Morocco in order to compensate for these 
implementation costs. 
Incentives 
The EU’s offer to countries in the southern neighbourhood essentially consists of ‘3 Ms’: 
Money, Mobility and Markets.27 This section looks at each of these incentives and 
assesses their impact or potential impact on the EURA negotiations. In addition, there 
is a ‘fourth M’ that was successfully used to persuade countries in the Western Balkans 
and the Eastern neighbourhood to sign an EURA, namely membership. In the case of 
Morocco, EU membership is not on the table. However, the country aspires to become 
a close and special partner of the Union. Therefore, the last sub-section takes a closer 
look at the ‘advanced status’ agreement with Morocco. 
Money 
The first and perhaps most obvious incentive is money. Morocco has received 
significant funding under the ENI and its predecessor, the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The EU assistance amounted to € 1.4 billion over the 
period 2007-2013 and € 807.5 million over the period 2014-2017. In 2016, the EU 
allocated € 35 million under the ENI to support Morocco’s migration policies.28 
Cooperation in the field of migration has also been financed by the EU Emergency 
Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF Africa) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). 
Overall, the EU pledged € 232 million between 2014 and December 2018 to support 
migration-related activities in Morocco. Funds were used to support programmes in 
                                                 
26 J. Chara, “The Tale of Morocco in ECOWAS – Analysis”, Eurasia Review, 17 September 2018, 
retrieved 18 April 2019, https://www.eurasiareview.com/17092018-the-tale-of-morocco-in-
ecowas-analysis. 
27 European Commission, The EU's response to the 'Arab Spring', Press Release, Brussels, 16 
December 2011.  
28 European Commission, Morocco, op. cit. 
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the following areas: socio-economic integration of migrants (€ 10.1 million); 
governance of migration policies, institutional support and capacity building (€ 28.5 
million); protection, resilience and rights of migrants (€ 23.1 million); migration manage-
ment, border management and mobility (€ 92.8 million); and fight against migrant 
smuggling and human trafficking (€ 77.3 million).29 In December 2018, Morocco 
received an additional € 148 million from the EUTF Africa. The money was allocated to 
support Morocco's National Strategy for Immigration and Asylum, to improve the 
capacity of the Moroccan authorities to manage their borders and to fight against 
migrant smuggling and human trafficking as well as to help protect vulnerable 
migrants.30 
Although funding in the area of migration has been considerable, the EU has not been 
able to use it as a means of persuasion in the EURA negotiations. There are two factors 
that can explain this failure. First, Morocco has received the money despite its 
consistent refusal to sign an EURA. This is particularly problematic when it comes to the 
credibility of the EU’s conditionality and will be further discussed in the section on 
bargaining power. Second, the 2015 ‘migration and refugee crisis’ and especially the 
infamous EU-Turkey ‘refugee deal’ of March 2016 have revealed the vulnerability of 
the European Union. In exchange for Turkey’s commitment to take back Syrian 
refugees, the EU promised to allocate € 3 billion for refugees in Turkey.31 This sum was 
later increased to € 6 billion, of which € 2.7 billion were disbursed by December 2019.32 
Moroccan authorities know that they cannot expect to receive a similar amount of 
money as the number of migrants travelling to Europe via Morocco is much smaller.33 
However, they are likely to exploit the EU’s vulnerability to extract more money. Hence, 
in order to effectively use money as leverage in the EURA negotiations, the EU would 
need to provide more funding and link it to the signing and implementation of a 
readmission agreement. 
                                                 
29 European Commission, EU Cooperation on migration with Morocco, December 2018. 
30 European Commission, Western Mediterranean Route: EU reinforces support to Morocco, 
Press Release, Brussels, 14 December 2018. 
31 European Council, EU-Turkey statement, Press Release, Brussels, 18 March 2016. 
32 European Commission, EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey: €6 billion to support refugees and 
local communities in need fully mobilised, Press Release, Brussels, 10 December 2019. 
33 Frontex, Migratory Routes, retrieved 14 December 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-
borders/migratory-routes/western-mediterranean-route/ 
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Mobility 
A second set of incentives is related to legal migration and mobility. Actions in this field 
are based on the Mobility Partnership (MP) that was concluded in June 2013 between 
Morocco, on the one hand, and the EU and nine member states (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) 
on the other hand.34 In line with the four pillars of the EU’s Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility, the MP pursues the following objectives: (1) “to manage the 
movement of persons for short periods and legal and labour migration more 
effectively”, (2) “to strengthen cooperation on migration and development”, (3) “to 
combat illegal immigration, networks involved in the trafficking and smuggling of 
human beings, and to promote an effective return and readmission policy”, and (4) 
to “comply with duly ratified international instruments concerning the protection of 
refugees”.35 The MP is implemented through specific projects that can be proposed 
either by the participating member states, the Commission or the partner country.36 
Migration is a shared competence between the EU and the member states (Art. 4(2)(j) 
TFEU), and the Commission can only propose projects that fall within exclusive EU 
competence. Projects related to legal migration must, by contrast, be submitted by 
the member states (Art. 79(5) TFEU).37  
However, member states are often hesitant to offer legal migration opportunities, 
which is why the Mobility Partnership falls short of its potential. A closer look at the 
proposed projects reveals a clear emphasis on the fight against irregular migration. 
Out of 60 projects, 27 concern the prevention of irregular migration and border 
management. 15 projects are listed under the heading of ‘Mobility, legal immigration 
and integration’. However, most of them are related to information activities. None of 
the proposed projects aims at the creation of new opportunities for labour migration 
for Moroccan citizens.38 Another problem of the MP is its voluntary nature, which, 
                                                 
34 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between 
the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States, 6139/13, Brussels, 3 
June 2013. 
35 Ibid., p. 4. 
36 N. Reslow, “Deciding on EU External Migration Policy: The Member States and the Mobility 
Partnerships”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 34, no. 3, 2012, p. 224. 
37 European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007”, Official Journal of the European 
Union, C115, 9 May 2008. 
38 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership, op. cit., 
pp. 15-32. 
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according to the Commission, “makes it difficult to secure a balanced and complete 
EU offer to third countries”.39  
The Mobility Partnership also foresaw the opening of negotiations for a visa facilitation 
agreement (VFA) with Morocco. In the case of the eastern neighbourhood and 
candidate countries, VFAs were successfully used as incentives for the conclusion of 
EURAs. The Commission hoped that the prospect of receiving a VFA would do the trick 
also in the case of Morocco.40 Negotiations were launched in October 2013 and were 
supposed to be conducted in parallel with the EURA negotiations. However, the EU’s 
offer was not enough to get the EURA negotiations moving. This was partly related to 
the limited scope of the negotiations, as the proposal only concerned short-term 
visas.41 Another factor was the envisaged revision of the EU visa code that would have 
provided similar facilitations at lesser costs.42 The European Parliament finally adopted 
a new visa code in April 2019. The new regime establishes a clear link between visa 
policy and readmission. According to the new rules, “[t]he conditions for processing 
visa applications can be adapted depending on whether a non-EU country 
cooperates satisfactorily on the return and readmission of irregular migrants”.43 The 
new visa code also envisages an increase in the visa fee from € 60 to € 80. According 
to an official from DG HOME, this could be a strong incentive for Morocco to return to 
the parallel negotiation of readmission and visa facilitation agreements that was 
agreed in the MP.44 
Visa facilitation and possibilities for labour migration could be powerful incentives as 
these are important concerns for the Moroccan population. However, the EU has not 
been able to make use of this potential due to the different interests of the member 
states and the Commission. 
Markets 
Market access is currently not linked to the EURA negotiations with Morocco. However, 
the EU’s Action Plan on Return, that was adopted in September 2015, suggests that 
                                                 
39 European Commission, Report on the implementation of the Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility 2012-2013, COM(2014) 96, Brussels, 21 February 2014, p. 20. 
40 Interview with an EU official, op. cit. 
41 Carrera et al., op. cit., p. 7. 
42 Interview with an EU official, op. cit. 
43 European Commission, EU Visa Policy: Commission welcomes European Parliament adoption 
of stronger and more secure EU visa rules, Press release, Strasbourg, 17 April 2019. 
44 Interview with an EU official, op. cit. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 7/2019 
13 
“leverage should also be identified outside the home affairs area to increase 
cooperation on readmission from third countries”. It further specifies that this should 
include “development assistance, neighbourhood policy, trade agreements and 
trade preferences (with the possibility to link the conclusion of free trade agreements 
or the granting of preferential treatment for certain third countries to the parallel 
conclusion of a readmission agreement)”.45 Given the protracted nature of the EU’s 
EURA negotiations with Morocco, the Commission might be tempted to introduce 
such a link in future negotiation rounds. Therefore, it seems worthwhile exploring the 
potential impact of linking the negotiations on a free trade agreement and on 
readmission. 
At first sight, this form of issue-linkage seems to be a promising strategy for the EU to 
increase its leverage. This becomes clear when we look at the economic figures. The 
EU is the largest economy in the world with a population of 500 million and a GDP per 
capita of € 25,000.46 Trade with Morocco is rather insignificant for the EU. In 2018, 
Morocco represented the European Union’s 24th largest trading partner with a share 
of 1.0 % of its overall trade.47 This means that the EU could afford to withhold a free 
trade agreement in order to gain leverage in the EURA negotiations. Morocco, on the 
other hand, is heavily dependent on trade with the EU. In 2018, the European Union 
represented 57.5 % of Morocco’s total trade in goods and 63.9 % of its exports.48 In 
addition, the EU accounted for around 70 % of foreign direct investments in Morocco.49 
Given these figures, Morocco should have a strong interest in improving its access to 
the EU’s single market.  
The EU and Morocco started negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area (DCFTA) in March 2013. The DCFTA is supposed to enhance trade and investment 
flows and to further the integration of the Moroccan economy into the EU’s single 
market by aligning domestic legislation with the EU’s acquis communautaire.50 While 
the related reforms would undoubtedly benefit Morocco in the long term by 
                                                 
45 European Commission, EU Action Plan on Return, COM(2015) 453 final, Brussels, 9 September 
2015. 
46 European Commission, EU position in world trade, 18 February 2019, retrieved 15 April 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade.  
47 European Commission, European Union, Trade with Morocco, Directorate-General for Trade, 
19 March 2019, pp. 8-9.  
48 European Commission, Morocco, Directorate-General for Trade, 19 March 2019, p. 1. 
49 C. Teevan, EU-Morocco: A win-win partnership?, 30 June 2019, retrieved 15 August 2019, 
https://mipa.institute/6866.  
50 European Commission, Morocco, Directorate-General for Trade, May 2019.  
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modernising its economy and making it more competitive, they would also imply 
significant costs in the short and medium term.51 To comply with EU food safety 
standards, for example, Morocco would have to establish specialised laboratories and 
inspection regimes and conduct extensive trainings.52 The costs of legal approximation 
would have to be borne not only by state authorities, but also by Moroccan businesses, 
who often lack the financial and technical means to comply with EU standards.53 Even 
if they managed to adapt, Moroccan companies would still face difficulties to access 
the EU market, as they would probably not be able to compete with European firms. 
While access to the EU market would be out of reach – at least for a while – Moroccan 
companies would face increasing competitive pressure in the domestic market due 
to further liberalisation.54 Given the costs of legal approximation and the anticipated 
competitive pressure from foreign companies, it becomes clear why Morocco has 
been hesitant to conclude a DCFTA with the European Union. In July 2014, the 
Moroccan government suspended the negotiations in order to allow for an assess-
ment of the DCFTA’s potential impact on the Moroccan economy.55 The resulting 
impact study acknowledged the potential benefits of a DCFTA for the Moroccan 
economy and the country’s institutions but warned about the social challenges that 
such an agreement could bring.56 Another reason for Morocco’s reluctance to 
negotiate a DCFTA might be that the country already has a free trade area with the 
EU, covering industrial goods, and sectoral agreements for two of its most important 
industries, agriculture and fisheries.57 The prospect of concluding a DCFTA with the EU 
is therefore a less attractive incentive for Morocco than one might think at first glance. 
Apart from that, a DCFTA with Morocco might also cause legal problems. Both the 
agricultural and the fisheries agreements were challenged before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) by the Polisario Front, the National Liberation Movement 
of Western Sahara. The Polisario Front argued that the agreements violate EU and 
international law by including the territory of Western Sahara in their scope of 
                                                 
51 A. Adarov & P. Havlik, Benefits and Costs of DCFTA: Evaluation of the Impact on Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, Joint Working paper by the Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies and Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2016, p. 70. 
52 L. Delcour & K. Wolczuk, “Beyond the Vilnius Summit: Challenges for Deeper EU Integration 
with Eastern Europe”, Policy Brief, European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2013. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Adarov & Havlik, op. cit., p. 45. 
55 Teevan, op. cit.  
56 A. Naïm, “Négociations sur l’ALECA : Le Maroc toujours en « stand-by »”, LesEco.ma, 13 
January 2017. 
57 European Commission, Morocco, Directorate-General for Trade, May 2019. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 7/2019 
15 
application. In December 2015, the General Court ruled that the EU-Morocco 
agreement shall be “annulled in so far as it approves the application of that 
agreement to Western Sahara”.58 In reaction, the Moroccan government suspended 
“all contact and cooperation with EU institutions”.59 On 16 January 2019, the European 
Parliament adopted an amended version of the agricultural agreement.60 On 12 
February 2019, the new Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement also received the 
Parliament’s approval.61 These resolutions and the subsequent Council decisions 
paved the way for the relaunch of DCFTA negotiations in June 2019.62 However, the 
issue is not yet resolved, as the Polisario Front already initiated new legal proceedings 
against the Council decisions.63 It remains to be seen whether the CJEU will partially 
annul them again. If the EU considered using a DCFTA as an incentive in the EURA 
negotiations, it would have to find a practical solution for the Western Sahara issue. 
Advanced status 
Membership is often considered as the most powerful incentive at the EU’s disposal. 
Most of the countries that have concluded an EURA are either candidate countries or 
potential candidate countries. For them, the costs of implementing an EURA are 
compensated by the prospect of accession to the European Union. Eastern neigh-
bourhood countries like Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova are not candidate countries but 
can realistically hope to obtain that status in the future. In the case of Morocco, 
however, membership has been ruled out. The Kingdom’s application to join the 
European Communities in 1987 was rejected on the grounds that Morocco is not a 
European country.64 Instead of membership, the country has aspired to become a 
very close and special partner of the Union. In March 2000, King Mohammed VI set the 
official target of ‘more than association, less than accession’.65  
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Morocco’s wish to become a privileged partner of the EU has been mainly driven by 
its quest for international legitimacy. Being recognised as the EU’s closest partner or as 
a ‘model student’ would not only boost Morocco’s international visibility and 
reputation but also its attractiveness to international investors.66 Moreover, Morocco 
has hoped that such an ‘advanced status’ would result in a more favourable EU 
perception of Morocco’s strategic interests (e.g. concerning the Western Sahara 
conflict) and increased financial assistance.67 To retain its status as a ‘model student’, 
Morocco must (at least formally) engage in EURA negotiations.68 
In 2008, the EU-Moroccan Association Council agreed on a ‘Joint Document on the 
Strengthening of Bilateral Relations/Advanced Status’.69 This advanced status 
agreement mainly deals with the strengthening of economic relations, suggesting 
among other things the conclusion of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.70 
Martín has questioned the added value of the advanced status, as it “does not grant 
any substantial concessions whatsoever in fields of strategic interest for Morocco, such 
as agricultural trade liberalization, mobility of Moroccan citizens or the level of financial 
cooperation”.71 However, the advanced status has a high symbolic value for Morocco 
because it demonstrates the special nature of the EU-Morocco partnership. Despite its 
significance for Morocco, the advanced status agreement was not used as leverage 
for the conclusion of an EURA. The document contains no reference to a readmission 
clause, which according to the 2002 Seville Council Conclusions should have been 
integrated into each new agreement.72 
This section has shown that the EU is either not ready to give a substantial incentive 
(migration and mobility) or that it provides it despite Morocco’s refusal to sign an EURA 
(money, advanced status). The following two sections analyse why this is the case. 
There are two explanations: the first is related to incoherence within the EU’s multilevel 
system of governance and the second to the EU’s bargaining power vis-à-vis 
Morocco. Market access has not been linked to the EURA negotiations so far. The 
potential impact of such a linkage should, however, not be overestimated as long-
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term benefits of a DCFTA are offset by short-term costs. In addition, legal problems 
regarding the inclusion of Western Sahara would have to be clarified, if the EU 
introduced such a link.  
Coherence 
Gebhard distinguishes four dimensions of coherence: “vertical coherence (between 
the member states and the Union level), horizontal coherence (between the supra-
national and the intergovernmental spheres at Union level), internal/intra-institutional 
coherence (within each domain of external action) and external coherence 
(between the EU and external actors)”.73 These different dimensions of coherence are 
interlinked and reinforce each other.74 
Vertical incoherence 
Migration is a shared competence between the EU and its member states, with the 
latter retaining the competence over admission policy.75 Article 79(5) TFEU states that 
“this Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes of 
admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in 
order to seek work”.76 Despite several attempts of the European Commission, member 
states have refused to transfer competences over legal migration to the European 
level. The admission of labour migrants affects social welfare and employment policies 
and is thus considered important for national sovereignty.77  
Visa facilitation is also seen with scepticism by member states. They are concerned 
that this could lead to irregular migration of visa overstayers. That is why they have only 
granted visa facilitation to potential candidate countries or countries who are 
insignificant in terms of numbers of irregular migrants.78 As mobility is one of Morocco’s 
key concerns, the reluctance of member states to grant legal pathways for migration 
severely limits the effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality in the EURA negotiations. The 
Commission has recognised the potential of visa facilitation as a source of leverage 
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and called on member states to “support the Commission’s readmission negotiating 
efforts more whole-heartedly and not lose sight of the overall interest that a concluded 
EURA represents for the entire EU.”79 
Horizontal incoherence 
The Council and the Commission have different approaches when it comes to 
migration. Dominated by the interests of member states’ interior ministries, the Council 
promotes a restrictive, control-oriented approach to migration. Its main goals are to 
combat irregular migration and to increase return rates.80 The Commission, on the 
other hand, prefers a more holistic approach that also tackles the root causes of 
migration.81 However, it has to be noted that the Commission is not a uniform actor 
and that DG HOME has other priorities than, for example, the DG for International 
Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO).  
While the Commission negotiates readmission agreements on behalf of the EU, the 
Council has to approve the mandate and also the final outcome of the negotiations.82 
Hence, the Commission has to take into account the Council’s interests throughout 
the negotiations and can only offer concessions that are likely to be accepted by the 
Council.83 A particular problem in the EURA negotiations has been the Council’s 
insistence on the inclusion of a TCN clause. Since Morocco has been reluctant to 
accept such a clause, the Commission has advocated dropping it from the 
agreement.84 However, the member states see the TCN clause as the added value of 
an EURA compared to their bilateral agreements. Consequently, the negotiation 
mandate does not allow any concessions in this regard and severely limits the 
Commission’s room for manoeuvre.85 
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Internal/intra-institutional incoherence 
Given member states’ reluctance to offer legal migration opportunities, the 
Commission has to resort to other incentives that fall within the EU’s competence. This 
requires cooperation between DG HOME, whose officials lead the EURA negotiations, 
and other Directorates-General of the Commission and the European External Action 
Service (EEAS). However, there are also different priorities and approaches within the 
Commission that undermine the consistent application of conditionality.86 The other 
DGs are generally reluctant to subordinate their own policy priorities to migration 
control objectives.87 DG DEVCO, for example, is concerned that DG HOME’s narrow 
focus on irregular migration could undermine development goals and thus resists 
attempts to redirect aid to countries that produce a lot of migrants instead of those 
that are most in need of development assistance.88 The Directorate-General for 
External Relations (DG RELEX), and since 2010 the EEAS, have been more concerned 
with broader political objectives.89 They fear that EURA negotiations could jeopardise 
political relationships with third countries and advocate a more balanced approach.90 
The negotiations for the advanced status agreement between the EU and Morocco 
illustrate these intra-institutional conflicts. According to the 2002 Seville Council 
Conclusions, any new agreement between the EU and a third state should have 
included a clause on readmission. However, the clause was eventually dropped from 
the advanced status agreement because DG RELEX did not want to endanger 
progress in bilateral relations.91  
External incoherence 
The EU has not presented a united front to Morocco during the EURA negotiations. 
Several member states have own informal arrangements with the Maghreb country 
which undermine the Commission’s efforts to negotiate a Union-wide agreement.92  
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Informal bilateral agreements have several advantages for Morocco in comparison 
with EURAs. First, informal agreements are more flexible. They do not require 
parliamentary ratification and can thus be easily renegotiated in order to adapt them 
to changing circumstances.93 Informal agreements are also less visible to the public as 
they are usually not published as official documents and often embedded within a 
broader framework of cooperation.94 This factor is particularly important for Morocco. 
Since readmission is highly unpopular among the population, the government prefers 
to keep cooperation in this field under the radar of public attention.95 In this way 
Morocco can cooperate on readmission while at the same time publicly expressing its 
opposition to the conclusion of a formal readmission agreement.96 
Second, parallel negotiations with the EU and with member states offer Morocco 
additional opportunities to obtain material and non-material benefits. In January 2016, 
for example, Sweden and Morocco agreed to establish a working party to deal with 
the identification and return of unaccompanied minors. In exchange, Sweden 
committed to support programmes for their re-integration and education in 
Morocco.97 In addition, the Swedish government announced that it would not 
recognise the independence of Western Sahara.98 In February 2016, Germany and 
Morocco agreed to speed up the procedure for identifying Moroccan citizens. In 
return, Germany promised to support the Council’s appeal against the CJEU’s decision 
to partly annul the agricultural and fisheries agreements with Morocco.99 These recent 
examples demonstrate how Morocco has been “shopping for its needs” between 
different member states and the EU.100 Morocco prefers bilateral negotiations 
because it can exert more leverage vis-à-vis individual member states than vis-à-vis 
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the EU as a whole.101 The Moroccan government is afraid that it would lose this bilateral 
leverage through the conclusion of an EURA.102  
Third, Morocco can use its leverage vis-à-vis individual member states to influence EU 
decision-making.103 Spain has long acted as a mediator for Moroccan interests in the 
Council of the EU. In 2005, Spain pushed for the Global Approach to Migration in order 
to accommodate Morocco’s interests and ensure its continued cooperation on 
irregular migration.104 More recently, the Spanish government has put pressure on the 
EU institutions to approve additional funding for Morocco.105 During a meeting with the 
Moroccan King Mohamed VI, the Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez stated that 
“[t]he EU has to, in a structural way, offer economic resources for Morocco”.106  
Finally, external incoherence gives Morocco the opportunity to ‘resist’ or ‘avoid’ the 
conclusion of an EURA. Some member states are more concerned by irregular 
migration from Morocco than others. Morocco can engage in negotiations with the 
most concerned member states and offer them concessions at the bilateral level. This 
makes the conclusion of an EU-wide readmission agreement less important for them 
and consequently reduces the pressure on Morocco.107 
For these reasons, Morocco has an interest to keep bilateral channels open. The 
conclusion of an EURA would render Morocco’s ‘divide and rule’ strategy more 
difficult and is thus not in Morocco’s interest.108 At the same time, however, Morocco 
tries to keep the prospect of an EURA alive to continue receiving benefits from the 
EU.109  
This section has shown that the Commission’s ability to offer attractive incentives to 
Morocco has been hampered by incoherence between the EU and the member 
states, who have been reluctant to offer legal migration opportunities. The Council’s 
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insistence on including a TCN clause has further limited the Commission’s room for 
manoeuvre in the EURA negotiations. Given member states’ reluctance, the 
Commission has only been able to offer benefits that fall within the EU’s exclusive 
competence. However, there have also been different priorities and interests within 
the Commission’s DGs. This is why the readmission clause in the advanced status 
agreement was eventually dropped to the detriment of the credibility of the EU’s 
conditionality. Finally, the Commission’s efforts to negotiate an EURA have been 
undermined by the parallel conclusion of bilateral agreements with member states. 
These have given Morocco an opportunity to obtain additional benefits, to influence 
EU decision-making and ultimately to avoid the conclusion of an EURA. 
Bargaining power 
The effective use of conditionality requires superior bargaining power on the part of 
the European Union, otherwise threats would not be credible.110 While the EU is usually 
the stronger partner in negotiations, this is not necessarily the case when it comes to 
migration. Since the end of the 1990s, the EU has sought to “off-shore” and “out-
source” migration policy to third countries.111 This ‘externalisation’ has involved both 
the “exportation of classical migration control instruments” (e.g. “border control, 
measures to combat illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking, and capacity-
building of asylum systems and migration management in transit countries”) and the 
return of irregular migrants.112 The externalisation of migration control to third countries 
has led to the EU’s dependence on the latter. This dependence is particularly strong 
in the case of Morocco, which is one of the most important countries of origin and 
transit of irregular migrants. As a consequence, Morocco is now able to set its own 
conditions, which the EU must adhere to if it wishes to prevent mass migration to 
Europe. Cassarino has dubbed this phenomenon “reversed conditionality”.113 
Morocco has repeatedly used the threat of relaxing border controls as a bargaining 
tool to obtain economic and political concessions from the EU. In 2003, the Minister 
Delegate for Moroccans living abroad, Nezha Chekrouni, stated unambiguously that 
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her country’s cooperation in combatting irregular migration depends on the “great 
responsibility of the EU to support [Morocco’s] development efforts”.114 After the 
CJEU’s partial annulment of the agriculture and fisheries agreements in 2015, the 
Moroccan government issued a statement that could be interpreted as an implicit 
threat to relax border controls: 
“Any obstacle in the application of this agreement is a direct attack on thousands 
of jobs […] on both sides, and risks the resumption of migratory flows, which 
Morocco has succeeded in containing through a deliberate, sustained effort”.115  
Aziz Akhannouch, the Moroccan Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, reaffirmed 
Morocco’s position in an interview, saying:  
“How do you [Europe] expect us to do the work of blocking African and even 
Moroccan emigration if Europe doesn’t want to work with us? Why should we 
continue acting as police and giving them [Africans in Morocco] work?”116  
The threatening rhetoric was accompanied by an upsurge in the number of irregular 
migrants crossing into Spain. Within 72 hours after the statement had been issued, 853 
irregular migrants reached Ceuta. This equated to almost half of the number of 
irregular migrants that had managed to enter the Spanish exclave in 2016.117 Teevan 
suspects that the comparatively high number of border crossings was meant “as a 
warning to the EU and member states not to threaten Moroccan interests in the 
Western Sahara”.118  
When the number of irregular arrivals rose again in 2018, there had been speculations 
that Morocco deliberately eased its border controls to put pressure on the EU to 
receive more financial assistance.119 The provision of € 55 million in additional funds to 
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Morocco and Tunisia suggests that this strategy was seemingly successful.120 After the 
EU had met its conditions, Morocco accepted the return of 116 migrants that had 
irregularly crossed the border with Spain and deported hundreds of Sub-Saharan 
African migrants to the south of Morocco.121  
Morocco also used reversed conditionality to gain support for its National Strategy for 
Immigration and Asylum. The Kingdom argued that it cannot implement the strategy 
on its own and requested assistance to finance implementation measures. The EU had 
a strong interest in implementing this strategy and therefore little choice but to accept 
Morocco’s conditions.122 That is why, in December 2018, Morocco received another 
€ 148 million in migration-related assistance.123 
The EU’s dependence in the field of migration adversely affects the use of 
conditionality in the EURA negotiations because the EU is not able to withhold the 
benefits in case Morocco does not sign a readmission agreement. The EU’s interest in 
obtaining Morocco’s cooperation in the fight against irregular migration is greater 
than its wish to conclude a readmission agreement. Therefore, it has been ready to 
meet Morocco’s demands for financial assistance even in the absence of the latter’s 
commitment to sign an EURA. Hence, Tittel-Mosser rightfully argues that “Morocco’s 
reversed conditionality might be even stronger than the EU’s conditionality”.124 
Conclusion 
This study set out to explain why the EU has been unable to conclude a readmission 
agreement with Morocco. It argued that EURA negotiations are mainly in the interest 
of the EU and that their successful conclusion therefore depends on the effective use 
of conditionality. Subsequently, the paper identified four variables that are decisive for 
the effectiveness of conditionality: Morocco’s implementation costs, the incentives 
offered by the EU, the coherence of the EU’s actions and its relative bargaining power 
vis-à-vis Morocco.  
                                                 
120 European Commission, EU Trust Fund for Africa: additional € 90.5 million to strengthen border 
management and protection of migrants in North Africa, Press Release, Brussels, 6 July 2018. 
121 Teevan, More for Less?, op. cit. 
122 F. Tittel-Mosser, “Reversed conditionality in EU external migration policy: The case of 
Morocco”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 14, no. 4, 2018, p. 357. 
123 European Commission, EU reinforces support to Morocco, op. cit. 
124 Tittel-Mosser, op. cit., p. 358. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 7/2019 
25 
The findings suggest that Morocco would have to bear significant costs to implement 
an EURA. A more consistent deportation of Moroccan citizens would result in a loss of 
remittances and potentially cause problems with the re-integration of migrants. In 
addition, a TCN clause would have negative repercussions for Morocco’s relations 
with countries of origin.  
The paper then looked at the incentives that the EU has offered to compensate for 
Morocco’s implementation costs. The EU has provided considerable amounts of 
money to Morocco and responded to the Kingdom’s desire to become a special and 
privileged partner by granting it an advanced status. These benefits could have acted 
as powerful incentives for the conclusion of an EU readmission agreement. However, 
they have been granted despite Morocco’s consistent refusal to sign an EURA. The 
study has argued that the EU is unable to withhold benefits in case of non-compliance 
because the power asymmetry is reversed in the field of migration. Due to the gradual 
externalisation of migration policies, the EU has become more dependent on 
Morocco than vice versa. This has reached a point, where Morocco can set its own 
conditions, with which the EU has to comply.  
The credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality have been further 
undermined by incoherence. The Commission has been unable to offer attractive 
incentives in the field of migration and mobility because member states have been 
reluctant to offer legal migration opportunities. The Council’s insistence on a TCN 
clause and different priorities within the European Commission have further limited DG 
HOME’s room for manoeuvre in the negotiations. Even more problematic, however, 
has been the conclusion of bilateral agreements between individual EU member 
states and Morocco. These bilateral channels have provided Morocco with an 
opportunity to obtain additional benefits and to influence EU decision-making. 
Consequently, the Moroccan government will have little incentive to conclude an 
EURA as long as these bilateral alternatives exist.  
Finally, based on the above analysis, the following policy suggestions can be made: 
(1) the EU should try to conclude more readmission agreements with countries of origin 
of irregular migrants to take some pressure off Morocco. The latter should be granted 
a multi-year transition period until it has to readmit third-country nationals; (2) the 
allocation of funding and the conclusion of new agreements with Morocco should be 
linked to progress in the EURA negotiations, as was already foreseen by the Seville 
Council conclusions; (3) to lower its dependence on Morocco, the EU should 
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strengthen its external border management, notably through the reinforcement of its 
border-control agency Frontex; (4) negotiations for a visa facilitation agreement 
should be relaunched and its scope should be expanded to a wider range of 
beneficiaries; and (5) member states should support the EURA negotiations more 
wholeheartedly and stop negotiating their own bilateral agreements. 
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